Brilliant animation presents a neat overview of the Battle of Cannae


Battle of Cannae (216 BC), contested between the ancient Mediterranean powerhouses of Rome and Carthage, is usually considered as a particularly bloody episode – which had (possibly) resulted in the highest loss of human life in a single day in any battle recorded in history. Suffice it to say, it was a momentous scenario of history that not only showcased the ingenuity of military generalship for one side (Carthaginians) but also the long-term effects of cultural tenacity for the other side (Romans). And now this massive scale of human confrontation has been presented from a tactical perspective in a brilliantly conceived animated short by YouTuber Historia Civilis.


1) The forces of Hannibal in Italy –


While the video does a great job of describing the Roman army at the Battle of Cannae, we should understand how the army of Hannibal was markedly different by virtue of its heterogeneous composition. In fact, Livy attested to Hannibal’s leadership skills by mentioning how the general managed to not only control his mercenary army (which had been described as ‘a hotch-potch of the riff-raff of all nationalities’), but went on to win victories over the Roman forces for fifteen straight years – and that too within the confines of Italy. The irony in this case related to how the same folks who fought for money and plunder, grouped together to forego such things in favor of innumerable hardships for their chosen leader. This certainly speaks highly of the potent charisma demonstrated by Hannibal all throughout these rigorous years spent in a foreign land.

To that end, since we are talking about the ‘mercenaries’, the Carthaginian army that cross over from the Alps, mostly consisted of African (including Liby-Phoenicians and Numidians), Iberian (including the Balearic islanders) and Celtic soldiers – with their vastly variant cultures being integrated into a nigh professional force that regularly triumphed over the more homogeneous Romans. And intriguingly enough, Hannibal and his officers didn’t force any scope of uniformity on their ‘rag-tag’ army. On the contrary, the commanders expected each of the cultural domains to bring its own set of ‘native’ skills and expertise on the battlefield – thus resulting in the ultimate ‘counter’ army that could thrive in most tactical scenarios.

2) Strategy translating to tactics – the ‘pilum fodder’


Illustration by Angus McBride. Credit: Osprey Publishing.

The video explains how the Romans strengthened their center by massing columns that had greater depth and lesser frontage at the Battle of Cannae. On the other side, Hannibal opted for quite an opposite tactic of rather ‘weakening’ his center – and this part of the Carthaginian army was mostly composed of Gauls. Now from the logical viewpoint, Hannibal must have known that this Carthaginian position would incur greater number of casualties, given the Roman penchant for advancing straight-on to the main enemy lines after discharging their deadly ‘pila‘ (javelins). But still the general took the gamble, and centrally positioned his expendable ‘pilum fodder’ Celts – an audacious tactical ploy that we will discuss later in the article.

Now the question arises – why was Hannibal’s evaluation of (most) Celtic soldiers seemingly so harsh? Well part of it possibly had to do with the erratic political affiliations of many Celtic tribes in Cisalpine Gaul, many of whom proved to be unreliable during the course of the Second Punic War. As for the warfare side of affairs, while the well-armored Celtic cavalry forces (mostly derived from their nobles and retainers) were crucial to the success of some Carthaginian engagements in Italy, many of their Gaulish infantrymen counterparts were generally considered as an undisciplined bunch that favored individual bravery over group-based tactics. These Celtic men were often armed with long slashing swords and protected by only oval, leather-covered shields; while few even went to battle entirely naked. Furthermore, we should also take note of how Hannibal’s initial army consisted of only the African and Spanish troops, while the Celts were recruited ‘later’ on the way to Alps and beyond. So there might have been a strategic scenario in Cannae where Hannibal wanted to preserve his ‘core’ army of Spaniards and Africans (for future battles), while the rank-swelling yet ill-equipped Celts were given the task of directly facing their long-known adversaries – the Romans.

3) The Carthaginian cavalry –


The video makes numerous mentions of the Carthaginian cavalry and their presumed superiority both in terms of numbers and quality. But as with the main force of Hannibal, very few of these noted cavalrymen actually hailed from Carthage. To that end, the right flank of Hannibal’s army at Cannae was covered by the Numidian riders armed with only javelins. Espousing daredevilry on horseback, they probably rode without reins – instead using just a rope around the horse’s neck and a small stick to give it commands. In many cases (like at the Battle of Trebbia), Hannibal utilized their nigh-perfected mobility and zig-zag maneuvering ability to draw the attention (and ire) of the Romans. Such skirmishing tactics, often mixed with vocal insults, in turn forced the roused Roman to give battle even when they were under-prepared.

The left flank of the Carthaginian side was shielded by the ‘heavy’ variety of the aforementioned Celtic horsemen. Usually derived from their nobles and retainers, many of these these cavalrymen were richly attired in expensive mail and helmets – and thus fulfilled the role of the pseudo shock mounted troops (a task that was paramount in the Battle of Cannae). Hannibal also fielded Spanish cavalry forces, who were mounted atop stout horses, but were armed in a similar fashion to their infantry counterparts – with short falcata swords and smaller spears. They mainly served as medium cavalry useful for sustaining the initial charges, while also being flexible enough for pursuing retreating enemy forces.

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4) The extraordinary ‘convex-crescent’ –


Hannibal proceeded on to array his entire army* (of 35,000 – 40,000 infantrymen and around 10,000 cavalry) into ‘tailored’ formations that were dedicated to countering the superb infantry quality and numerical advantage of Romans, who had probably fielded somewhere between 50,000 – 63,000 infantrymen* (along with around 6,400 cavalry – combining both the Romans and allied forces). Now it should be noted that among these 35,000 infantrymen under Hannibal’s command at Cannae, the ‘crack’ experienced soldiers from Africa and Iberia – who had originally crossed the Alps, only numbered around 14,000 men. Thus the remainder bulk of the infantry comprised the Celts and other assorted lightly-armed troops. As for Carthaginian cavalry forces, the seasoned Spaniards and Numidians formed the majority of 6,000 horsemen, while the remaining 4,000 were formed by the ‘elite’ Celtic cavalry derived from their nobles and retainers.

Now one of the first counter-measures of Hannibal at the Battle of Cannae was to put his ‘heavy’ cavalry forces (of Celts and Spaniards) on the left flank, to directly oppose (and clear out) the Roman cavalry under consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus. On the right flank, the Numidians were deployed and expected to carry out their unorthodox style of luring in the Roman-allied cavalry forces and then dispatching them with well-timed javelin throws. But the biggest surprise came from the infantry formations of Hannibal. Instead of opting for the traditionally strong center, the Carthaginian general deliberately arrayed his most ‘expendable’ Celtic soldiers along the middle portion, and they were complemented by alternate companies of Spanish and Celtic soldiers in the successive flanks. Finally, the two ‘hidden’ wings of the infantry were filled by the heavy African troops (Liby-Phoenicians) who were possibly attired in ‘Roman’ style, with armors that were stripped off the dead Roman soldiers in the previous encounters. As for their tactics, some historians have talked about how these crack troops adopted the phalanx formation – though we are still not sure of their exact maneuvers.

After arranging his entire line, Hannibal commanded his central body of troops to slightly move forward while keeping their links with their successive flanks. As a result, a convex-crescent of formations emerged from the Carthaginian side (showcased in the image above), with the two wings thinning out and covering the heavy African troops.

5) The ‘Trap’ –


By the time the massed Roman columns (which were kept deeper, thus reducing their width) reached the Carthaginian lines, Hannibal’s heavy cavalry forces on the left flank (headed by Hasdrubal) had already pushed back the main Roman cavalry force commanded by their consul. As a matter of fact, Aemilius Paullus was himself injured by a sling-shot, and thus had to dismount – thus dealing a crippling blow to the morale of the proximate Roman soldiers. This allowed a gap to emerge on this side, and Hasdrubal took advantage of the retreating enemy to push through the momentary disconnect between the Roman cavalry and infantry lines on the left. He expertly traversed the ‘gap’ and wheeled around his fresh cavalry forces to meet the Roman infantry lines at their unguarded rear positions. On the other flank (right), the Numidians were successful in disrupting the Roman allied cavalry forces under the other consul Gaius Terentius Varro. They did so by their idiosyncratic fighting methods of zig-zag maneuvering and false retreats. Finally, a fresh detachment of heavy cavalry from the left joined their Numidian comrades, and together they successfully drove away the panicked Roman allied cavalrymen from the field.

However as mentioned in the video, in spite of the reversals of their cavalry forces, the main Roman infantry lines maintained their cohesion and pushed forth the ‘weak’ Carthaginian center with aplomb. The previously convex-crescent had now bulged ‘backwards’ into a concave with the disciplined Roman legions making short work of their mostly Celtic adversaries. But therein laid the audacious tactical trap sprung by Hannibal. That is because as the Romans pushed further in, they were met with alternate companies of Celtic and Spanish forces – soldiers who operated in distinct styles of warfare, with the boisterous Celts using their long slashing swords and the deft Spaniards using their short stabbing swords. This alluded to a confusing set of tactics to counter for the legions, since they had to continually adapt to the ‘changing’ nature of the enemy – thus limiting their progression while exacerbating their fatigue levels.

Finally, when the concave had ‘bulged’ sufficiently, Hannibal commanded his crack African troops from the hidden wings to join in the fray; and these (possible) phalanxes plunged deep into the tattering Roman flanks. The ‘coup de grace’ was then dealt by the Hasdrubal’s wheeling cavalry – as they struck the rear lines of the Roman infantry, thus completely surrounding the enemy inside a rough circle. By this time the Romans were so pressed for space that many of them didn’t even have room for swinging their swords. The end result of the Battle of Cannae, according to Livy, amounted to around 50,000-70,000 Roman deaths (though few modern estimates put down this figure to around 40,000) and 20,000 prisoners, while the Carthaginians suffered only 8,000 casualties.

6) The Paradox of Cannae –


Interestingly enough, it was the Battle of Cannae that was ultimately responsible for Hannibal’s unceremonious call back to Carthage (in 203 BC) after 15 years of remaining undefeated on Italian soil. In the post years of the Cannae incident, the Roman leadership came to a realization that they couldn’t counter Hannibal’s genius in conventional warfare. As a result, they reverted to the defensive Fabian strategy (named after Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus) which basically entailed a guerrilla-warfare type scenario with internal lines of communications. In other words, the Romans rigorously avoided open-field battles, while resorting to hit-and-run and harassing tactics that afflicted the stretched Carthaginian lines and patrols who were regularly dispatched for foraging.

This predicament was further exacerbated when Hannibal had to provide garrisons for the newly defected cities in south of Italy. This took away much of his precious manpower that had already deteriorated due to previous battles, skirmishes and attrition. Moreover, since much of Hannibal’s army was composed of mercenaries of different nationalities – they were neither suited to siege warfare or garrison duty, and thus many of them started to desert en masse. So slowly but surely, the once grand expeditionary force that made its way to Italy via the Alps, was now only a shadow of itself. By 203 BC, even chances of arriving reinforcements from Carthage or Iberia went slim, with both of his brothers being soundly defeated. And ultimately, Hannibal himself had to answer the desperate call from his own Barcid war party, which was one of the two major political factions of Carthage. So the general and some of his trusted mercenaries finally decided to set sail for Africa. And thus ended the epoch of Hannibal in Italy – paradoxically brought on by his incredible victory at the Battle of Cannae.

The Roman tenacity for ‘comebacks’ was also demonstrated by the Battle of Zama, 14 years after the disastrous Battle of Cannae. This time around, it was Scipio Africanus who took the war to the North African heartlands of Carthage (just like Hannibal did in Italy), and the Romans sealed the outcome of the Second Punic war by defeating Hannibal in the major encounter.

7) The Perspective –


At the end the video offers a context of how the Battle of Cannae possibly snatched away a significant chunk of the Roman male population. In terms of sheer numbers, the baleful day probably accounted for over 40,000 Roman deaths (the figure is put at 55,000 by Livy; and 70,000 by Polybius), which equated to about 80 percent of the Roman army fielded in the battle! On a comparative note, the worst day in the history of the British Army usually pertains to the first day of the Battle of the Somme in 1916, where they lost around 20,000 men. But the male population of Rome in 216 BC is estimated to be around 400,000; and thus the Battle of Cannae possibly resulted in the deaths of around 1/10th – 1/20th of Roman male population (considering there were also allied Italic casualties), while Britain had a male population of around 20 million at the beginning of 1901. So objectively, from the numerical context, Britain lost around 0.001 percent of its male population in the country’s bloodiest single-day military encounter, while the Romans lost anywhere between 5-10 percent of their male population in their bloodiest encounter for a single day.

*The numbers mentioned in the article are estimates – compiled from both ancient and modern sources.

The article was composed from the excerpts of our previous article – 10 things you should know about the Battle of Cannae.

Video Source: Historia Civilis (YouTube)

Article Sources: Ancient Encyclopedia / UNRV / / Livy’s Account (

Book References: Cannae 216 BC: Hannibal Smashes Rome’s Army (By Mark Healy) / The Punic Wars (By Brian Caven) / Cannae: Hannibal’s Greatest Victory (By Adrian Goldsworthy)

6 Comments on "Brilliant animation presents a neat overview of the Battle of Cannae"

  1. More directly to my question, where in “Cannae 216 BC: Hannibal Smashes Rome’s Army (By Mark Healy)” is there a source (besides writer Mark Healy) that indicates Hannibal had a ‘harsh evaluation’ regarding the Celts (greek influenced Gauls) or the Gauls (Italic/Roman influenced Celts)?

    The assertion that Hannibal used Celts or hired mercenaries as fodder or had ‘harsh evaluation’ of them appears to be inserted into the narrative, for some reason. Hannibal was dependent upon them for supply lines and intelligence reports and both the Carthage and the Celtic Fort States and tribal nations had a special loathing of Roman prudence and snobbery.

    Post classical and 19th and 20th century writers did same thing with the story/narrative of Spartacus (the Thracian) and his renegade gladiator comrades Crixus, Gannicus, Castus, and Oenomaus who were Gallic, as were most of the gladiators and slaves of that era.

    Spartacus led the woman and children and older folks and small contingent of fighters toward the alps in a big for liberation and return to their own lands, Crixus and the larger formation of combatants went off to sacrifice themselves in drawing away and confronting the Roman Army.

    The modern creative revisionist version of the narrative depicted Crixus and the Gauls as being hostile to Spartacus and interested in plundering and foolish.

    The Romans adopted both their helmets and chain mail designs from the Gauls and Celts and i wanted to underscore how cool and badass the Gauls and Celts were and I just enjoy talking about it and conversing about it and seems like good opportunity to do that and perhaps spur you to write about the Gauls and Celts in future articles. 😉

    “I sound my barbaric yawp over the rooftops of the world.”

  2. Dattatreya Mandal | March 10, 2017 at 3:22 am |

    For source you can refer to – “Cannae 216 BC: Hannibal Smashes Rome’s Army (By Mark Healy)”. As for my personal ‘harsh evaluation’ of Celts, I never made that to begin with. In fact, I clearly mentioned how the Celtic nobles were preferred as the heavy cavalry arm of the forces of Hannibal, who proved their worth in Cannae. As for the Celtic infantry, I also provided reasons specific to Carthage. To that end, Carthaginians had a legacy of having Spanish and African troops in their core army – and these highly trained soldiers were available in lesser numbers when fighting in Italy, as opposed to the Cisalphine Gauls. So naturally Hannibal tried to preserve his ‘core’ army, thus making the Celts take the brunt of Roman legions.

    Ptolemies on the other hand had the legacy of using defensive-type phalangites (who were also available in lower numbers) and generally lower-quality native troops (machimoi). So the Celtic mercenaries and their aggressive brand of warfare were more than welcome there. In essence, the question was never about skills and abilities, it was about tactics on the battlefield.

  3. I dont find any sources that support your (author/Dattatreya) assertions regarding Hannibal’s alleged harsh evaluation of his Celtic retinues, they were actually among his elite forces and backbone of his infantry and skirmishers. While he and his Celtic/Gallic allies did feud with a few tribes who were territorial regarding some of the alpine passes it wasnt at all due to a prejudice of Hannibal.

    The Gauls/Celts were arch enemies of Rome and cultural affiliates of Carthage and with many connections and associations dating back to before the Celtic sack of both Rome and Delphi, and as with Alexander the Great and Ptolemy after him, Celts or Gauls were often serving as both mercenaries and elite guards and contingents, well known for their skills and abilities.

    I have to wonder why the author has such a harsh evaluation regarding the Celts whom the Romans dreaded since the first sack of Rome when the Celts schooled them and inspired much of their later armor and prudent tactics and strategies.

    The animation is, mediocre in my estimate. The topic cant lose, its fun reading and imagining.

    Yop ! Vae victis! 😉

  4. Geoff Kieley | August 3, 2016 at 5:28 pm |

    your site is very professional, and your own efforts, Dattatreya, are very commendable. But you cheapen your brand by using rubbish amateur videos. They make me want to tune out. Many of your videos are excellent, but some are obviously amateur, and lower the tone of your otherwise excellent site

  5. Dattatreya Mandal | August 3, 2016 at 5:22 pm |

    Sorry you feel that way. But by ‘brilliant’ we wanted to point out the tactical scope of the battle presented by the video (in a simplistic manner). As with the ‘casual tone’ (“this kind of stuff makes me crazy”), YouTubers have a tendency do that. Anyway that is why our own write-ups accompany videos, to make it easier for some readers to appreciate the subject matter in a more serious manner. And as always, we value your readership.

  6. Geoff Kieley | August 3, 2016 at 1:28 pm |

    “Brilliant animation”?! Have you actually watched it? It’s rubbish! Little moving blocks! And the narrator sound like a 15 year old, with stupid interjections likes “this kind of stuff makes me crazy” (actually, we don’t care how it makes you feel), “my boy Caesar never would have done this” (he’s ‘your boy’?) and “If you ask me” (Nobody asked you). PLEASE stop using this guy’s animations. I like this site, but no video at all is better than this crap.

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